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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

'I
NO. 390
CRIMINAL

vs.
JAY D. FERRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

\

APPELLANT•s BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was tried by a jury in the Fifth Judicial
District Court in and for Millard County, with the Honorable
Will L. Hoyt presiding, for the offense of carnal knowledge,
alleged to have been committed on or about July 15, 1953,
on the person of June Peer, who was then 15 years of age.
The complainant was the mother of June Peer (T. 2).
The only evidence introduced by the State and received
by the court to prove the charge was:
(a) A birth certificate showing June Peer to have
been 15 years of age at the time of the alleged offense
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).
(b) A confession of the offense in the hand writin of Eldon A. Eliason, County Attorney for Millard
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County, allegedly dictated to him by the defendant on
·or about July 22nd, 1953, in the office of Sheriff Culbert Robison in Fillmore while the defendant was under arrest (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).
(c) The testimony of Sheriff Robison as to statements made by June Peer and the defendant in the
presence of each other, himself, ~nd County Attorney
Eliason in Eliason's office in Delta on July 30, 1953,
which statements, as related by the Sheriff, were declarations of participation in intercourse by June Peer
and confessions of guilt by defendant (T. 106 to 113).
The record contains considerable conflicting testimony
taken outside the presence of the jury on the question as
to whether or not the alleged confessions of the defendant
were voluntary (T. 6-103), and the court ruled that they
were (T. 101-102).
Although the trial had been set approximately three
months prior to the time it was held, the State did not have
present either the complainant or June Peer, and introduced no evidence other than above set forth, circumstantial
or direct, showing or tending to show that June Peer had
ever had sexual intercourse with anyone. The state assigned to the court as the reason for not having the complainant and June Peer present that they were in the state
of California, had been there some six weeks, and though
subpoenaed and requested more than once to be· present
they would not appear (T. 2).
Upon a verdict of guilty, the court pronounced judgment that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged,
and sentenced him to imprisonment in the state prison for
a term not to exceed five years. (See Minute Entry Dec. 5,
1953).
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STATEI\IENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IN THAT THIE STATE
FAILED TO PROVE OR TO INTRODUCE ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE THE CORPUS DELICTI, INDEPENDENT OF THE CONFESSIONS
OF THE DEFENDANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE VERDier AND JUDGMENT IN THAT THE STATE
FAILED TO PROVE OR TO INTRODUCE ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE THE CORPUS DELICTI, INDEPENDENT OF THE CONFESSIONS
OF THE DEFENDANT.
This Court held in State vs. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83
P. (2d) 1010 that there must be independent proof of the
corpus delicti before a confession can be received for the
consideration of the jury. See also State vs. Jessup, 98 Utah
482, 100 P. (2d) 969, and State vs. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,
120 P. (2d) 285. Since the decision in the Johnson case,
the point of law decided therein has been annotated in 127
A. L. R., commencing at page 1130, and it appears therefrom that some 41 jurisdictions have adopted the same or
a substantially similar rule. The rule is particularly applicable to sexual offenses. See annotation in 40 A. L. R. 460.
At page 1069, Volume 2 of \Vharton's Criminal Evidence, we find the following statement:
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"It is practically universally held that the corpus
delicit of a crime cannot be proved by an extrajudicial confession standing alone, but must be proven independly of it. Moreover, a verdict of guilty and a
subsequent conviction cannot be sustained upon an extrajudicial confession only. Stated conversely, the rule
is that an extrajudicial confession of the accused must
be corroborated by independent proof of the corpus
delicit of the crime."
The corpus delicit of the crime of carnal knowledge
obviously includes the fact of intercourse. That June Peer
actually had sexual intercourse at or about the time alleged
would have to be proved, or at least there would have to
be some evidence tending to prove the same, independent
of the confession of the defendant, before the defendant
could be convicted. The trial judge seemed to concede the
rule, but would not apply it in this case, because he apparently concluded that the declarations of participation by
June Peer in intercourse with the defendant and the acquiescense of the defendant in such declarations, as testified to
by Sheriff Robison, was sufficient independent proof of the
corpus delicit to justify receiving in evidence the defendant's written confession (T. 102 and 151). This, we submit, cannot be the law for it either permits the proof of the
corpus delicit by strictly hearsay evidence or renders meaningless the almost universal rule above stated.
If the declarations of June Peer to the effect that she
had intercourse with the defendant had not been made in
the presence of the defendant, but only in the presence of
the Sheriff and the County Attorney, such statements would
be pure hearsay and inadmissible. What, then, may make
such statements admissible, under certain conditions, when
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made in the presence of the defendant? Wharton in his
work on Criminal Evidence, Volume 2, Page 1, says:
"It may be stated as a general rule that, when a
statement is made in the presence and hearing of an
accused, incriminating in character, and such statement is not denied, contradicted, or objected to by him,
both the statement and the fact of his failure to deny
are admissable on a criminal trial as evidence of his
acquiescence in its truth. A statement so made would,
of itself, be objectionable as hearsay testimony, being
a statement made at some time other than at a present trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter therein asserted, and based entirely on the credibility of a
declarer not then before the court. However, as in the
case of admissions generally, the statements herein
considered are not offered as evidence of their truth
merely because they were uttered; they are secondary
in nature and are accepted in evidence as untainted by
the hearsay stigma merely because they are a necessary predicate to the showing of the substantive evidence, the reaction of the accused theretQ." (Boldface
supplied)

This principle is well illustrated by the rule that a
statement made by a person who would be incompetent to
testify is, nevertheless, admissible in evidence when made
in the presence of the defendant and not denied by him.
\Vharton Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, pp. 1094. And this
Court said in State vs. Snow®n, 23 Utah 318, 65 P. 479, at
pp. 482-483:
"The complaint was not admitted as original evidence of the truth of the facts therein sworn to, but
simply as a necessary incident, explaining and characterizing the nature of defendant's acquiescence or confession. Admissions and confessions may be implied
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fron1 the acquiescence of the party in the statements
of others made in his presence, when the circumstances are such as afford an opportunity to act or speak,
and would naturally call for some action or reply from
men similarly situated .
. And it makes no difference that the statements which call for a reply are
made by a party who is incompetent to testify . . . ''
We believe the conclusion is inescapable that the declarations of June Peer could not have been received in evidence by the trial court for any purpose, save and except
they may be considered as admissions or confessions of the
defendant; and if they were received in evidence on that
basis, they are no better than direct admisions or confessions of the defendant, and, therefore, could not be used as
proof of the corpus delicti.
It is patent that in the case at bar there was absolutely
no proof, even circumstantial ,showing or tending to show
that a crime had been committed, independent of the confessions of the defendant. Certainly two confessions of the
same alleged crime at different times would not each be
independent proof of the corpus delicti, furnishing a basis
for the admission in evidence of the other. If that were
true, all that would be necessary to satisfy the rule above
set forth would be for the sheriff or the prosecuting attorney to make sure that the defendant repeated his confession in the presence of a witness one minute, five minutes,
an hour, a day, or a week after it was first obtained, and
then the corpus delicti would be considered proved by independent evidence. "Independent evidence" must mean
evidence independent of the defendant's confessions, whether there be one or a dozen instances of confessing the same
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crime. See Forte vs. United States, 68 App. D. C. 111, 94F
(2d) 236, 127 A. L. R. 1120.
CONCLUSION

We are strongly of the opinion that there is absolutely
no competent evidence of the corpus delicti in this case, and
that therefore, the judgment of conviction should be reversed. The Court's attention is respectfully called to the
motion of the District Attorney for a continuance at the
beginning of the trial and the resistance of the defendant
to the motion (T. 1-2). The defendant had been in jail
from the time of his arrest in July until the trial in December ,and the judge, in denying the motion, stated that the
State had had ample time to produce the complainant and
the alleged victim. In this we concur, and for this Honorable
Court to merely grant the defendant a new trial now would
be in effect granting the State's motion. We respectfully
ask, therefore, that the case be reversed with instruction to
the trial court to dismiss the action in acoordance with the
defendant's motion to dismiss, made at the conclusion of
the State's case.
Respectfully submited,
ALDRICH & BULLOCK,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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